Gong’s Recommendations: How to Protect Civil Society from Attacks and Disinformation Campaigns

23. October 2025.
Gong’s Recommendations: How to Protect Civil Society from Attacks and Disinformation Campaigns 1

Gong presented to Croatia’s civil society its analysis of attacks on civil society organizations during the 2025 local election campaign.

Following the analysis of these attacks and the consequences of such smear campaigns, Gong also developed a set of civil society recommendations for institutions in Croatia and the EU. The goal of these recommendations is to improve the position of civil society, as well as to protect organizations and activists from attacks, disinformation, and defamation campaigns.

The analysis itself consists of three steps. In the first two, we focused on social media – Facebook and Instagram. Besides being the most popular social networks in Croatia, every candidate had an official account on these platforms. Therefore, we observed the official communication of candidates, analyzing their posts and comments related to civil society. We then specifically categorized negative and disinformation posts about civil society and analyzed the sentiment of those posts.

In the third phase, we designed and distributed a survey questionnaire to civil society organizations. Based on the survey results, we also conducted structured interviews with selected organizations that had been targets of disinformation campaigns during the pre-election period.
These two methods were combined in order to identify points of convergence and divergence between the insights from the second level of analysis and the organizations’ own experiences, as well as to determine the overall prevalence of malicious content directed against civil society in Croatia.

The analysis reveals a broad and deeply entrenched malicious narrative targeting a human rights advocacy and cultural civil society organisations. This was particularly evident in Croatia’s capital – Zagreb. Therefore, the analysis primarily focused on the capital city, as during the campaign the ruling party in Zagreb was (and has remained) one whose opponents criticized it for having several members who had previously been active in civil society organizations. Virtuallyevery mention of civil society organisations by politicians during the 2025 local elections in the City of Zagreb was overwhelmingly negative and critical. Unlike the 2021 elections, this narrative was not used solely by radical right-wing actors but was actively embraced by the entire spectrum of political opposition, regardless of ideological orientation. Notably, some candidates devoted a substantial part of their campaigns to deliberately spreading and fuelling the malicious narrative of a “financial–interest–corruption network” linking civil society and the ruling party in Zagreb - Možemo! (We can!). In addition, the real significance of promoting such a malicious narrative by politicians lies in its amplification and escalation in the digital space by certain media portals, anonymous social media users, and public figures, further weaponizing allegations about the financing of civil society organisations in Zagreb.

However, the analysis found—based on insights from the experiences of civil society organisations at the national level—that while this malicious narrative is most heavily concentrated in Zagreb, it is also present beyond the capital, albeit in a different form. While Zagreb-based organisations are, through this narrative, portrayed as part of a supposed “financial–interest–corruption network” connected to the current city government, outside Zagreb organisations are attacked because of the values and topics they engage with.

In those cases, a specific civil society organisation is not directly targeted; rather, it is attacked more broadly because it is part of the category “civil society.” Within the malicious narrative, such a category is framed and stigmatised as “agents of a foreign agenda” imposing undesirable policies and values on Croatia and Croatian society. Their work, in such instances, is portrayed as irrelevant, harmful, and unwanted, and they are accused of relying on (foreign) funding, with growing demands to cut off their financing and terminate their activities.

By recording the frequency of specific themes in the observed malicious narrative, examining its nature, presenting relevant case studies, and documenting the experiences of civil society organisations, the analysis provides systematic insights into the ways in which this narrative has taken root and been weaponised. Through this analysis, Gong seeks to alert the institutions and the whole civil sector to the serious risks and potentially damaging consequences for democracy and the integrity of civil society posed by unregulated political communication on social media and during election campaigns.

The malicious and harmful narrative about progressive CSOs has become an unavoidable part of the mainstream agenda in the 2025 local election campaign in Croatia. Malicious, disinformation-laden narratives were often repeated and transmitted in mainstream media without any questioning or critical distance. Likewise, political actors at various levels of government—from Members of Parliament to city councillors—made false statements and defamatory claims as if stating facts, without facing any repercussions. According to estimates from organizations participating in this research, such behaviour has caused them substantial reputational damage, which could ultimately result in a long-term decline in trust in the work of CSOs and their contributions to society and democracy.

The conclusion of the analysis is that this narrative has taken a prime-time slot, becoming part of the mainstream discourse, while neither the media, politicians, nor institutions have debunked it or explained how civil society works, how public calls for proposals for CSOs function, and how much CSOs contribute to society — in other words, the specific, tangible results achieved through the projects carried out by the CSOs.

Based on the analysis of a defamation campaign during the 2025 local elections—primarily waged in Zagreb—which showed that negative, defamatory, and insulting narratives against civil society spread by certain political actors, media, influencers, or individuals are later adopted, legitimised, and echoed by mainstream politicians and media, Gong has formulated a set of recommendations. It is therefore imperative to raise public awareness of this issue and take concerted, decisive steps against the harmful impact of defamation campaigns.

Gong’s set of recommendations, intended to encourage dialogue between civil society organisations and relevant institutions, is open to further additions. Gong presented its recommendations at an event for civil society organizations in Zagreb, where it invited other organizations from across Croatia to contribute to and expand on the first draft of the recommendations — which they did. We repeated the same process during one of Gong’s workshops for civil society, focused on disinformation attacks and digital safety.

Recommendations:

  1. Stronger and More Proactive Institutional Support for Civil Society Work
  2. Establishing Legal Practice and Prompt Institutional Response to Attacks and Complaints
  3. A More United and Concrete Civil Society Response to Attacks
  4. Media Should Verify Claims Before Publishing
  5. More Consistent and Uniform Enforcement of the Digital Services Act
  6. Social Networks Must Assume Their Share of Responsibility
  7. Better Regulation and Oversight of “Black Funds” in Electoral Campaigns
  8. Educating Civil Society Organizations about Rights under the Digital Services Act and Complaint Mechanisms
  9. Political Parties Should Sign an Ethical Code Committing to Not Use Disinformation and Other Unethical Practices in Campaigns
  10. National Institutions Must Consistently Sanction Political Actors on Social Media
  11. Ensure the prompt provision of legal and psychological support for associations and for individuals who work or volunteer in civil society organizations and become targets of attacks
  12. Advocate for the inclusion, within the first European Civil Society Strategy, of dedicated support for advocacy and human rights organizations that contribute to the values of liberal democracy
Gong’s Recommendations: How to Protect Civil Society from Attacks and Disinformation Campaigns 2
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